In cases where attorney’s fees are a disputed issue, each party’s attorney provides an Attorney’s Fee Affidavit, which represents his or her work on a particular case. I always find it interesting to compare other attorney’s affidavits with my own bills, to determine how other firms are billing their clients. In reviewing some of those bills, I located a case, Browne v. Costales, 579 So.2d 161 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) where the Third District Court of Appeal wasn’t exactly happy with the billing practices of the lawyer:

“Appellee’s second attorney, the recipient of a $20,000 attorney fee award, did not keep time records because he relied on ‘unit billing.’ Appellee’s counsel admitted at oral argument that his apparently silver-tongued efforts as trial counsel secured no equitable distribution, no lump sum alimony, and no permanent or rehabilitative alimony for the wife in this one and one-half year marriage; the sole result which he obtained was $10,000 in temporary support monies.”

The Court explained that unit billing is a practice where the attorney bills a predetermined number of minutes for a given task. The Court found that the attorney’s practice of unit billing was unacceptable, and “serves to fuel the opprobrium felt for the legal profession.”

The Court went on to note that the attorney had “the effrontery to explain that his unit billing included the time necessary for him to fold the paper, stuff the envelopes, and seal them (no doubt with his silver tongue).”

The Court also cited to The Florida Bar v. Richardson, 574 So.2d 60 (Fla.1990) where the Florida Supreme Court suspended an attorney, finding “absolutely no justification” for unit billing, stating: Lawyers are officers of the court. The court is an instrument of society for the administration of justice. Justice should be administered economically, efficiently, and expeditiously. The attorney’s fee, is therefore a very important factor in the administration of justice, and if it is not determined with proper relation to that fact it results in a species of social malpractice that undermines the confidence of the public in the bench and bar. It does more than that; it brings the court into disrepute and destroys its power to perform adequately the function of its creation. The Florida Bar v. Richardson, 574 So.2d at 62 (quoting Baruch v. Giblin, 122 Fla. 59, 164 So. 831 (1935)).